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Abstract
It is essential that the new democracies of post-communist Central and Eastern Europe enjoy
the full support of their citizenry. Among social scientists there is an ongoing debate about
which conditions ensure mass support. Is political output, like individual freedom, or
economic output, like citizens’ financial situation, a more potent force in generating
approval for the newly established democratic institutions? In this paper we explore the
question “what matters more: politics or economics?” by means of various survey data. A
macro-analysis of many countries reveals that political support is correlated with democra-
tic development, but also – and more strongly – with economic and social conditions. A
micro-analysis of two countries reveals that while in East Germany the perception of
guaranteed liberties contributes most to satisfaction with democracy, in Hungary the
personal economic situation is most influential. The results do not confirm the view that
politics are the most important factor for mass support in all post-communist counties.
Furthermore we argue that it is fruitful to take into account other domains of regime
performance like social security, social justice and protection.
Für die neuen Demokratien in Mittel- und Osteuropa ist es wichtig, die Unterstützung der
Bevölkerung zu haben. Doch welche gesellschaftlichen Bedingungen Politikzufriedenheit
am stärksten fördern, darüber gibt es anhaltende Debatten. Sind die politischen Erträge der
Transformation, wie Freiheiten und Demokratie, ausschlaggebend? Oder ist es die wirt-
schaftliche Situation? Mit Hilfe verschiedener Umfragedaten geben wir in diesem Arbeitspa-
pier eine Antwort auf die Frage “Was zählt mehr: Politik oder Ökonomie?” Eine Makro-
Analyse mit vielen Ländern zeigt, daß die Bewertung des neuen politischen Systems mit der
demokratischen Entwicklung eines Landes zusammenhängt – doch für die wirtschaftliche
und soziale Situation ergeben sich noch stärkere Zusammenhänge. In einer Mikro-Analyse
mit zwei Ländern wird gezeigt, daß in Ostdeutschland die Demokratiezufriedenheit vor allem
davon abhängt, ob Freiheiten und Bürgerrechte als realisiert gelten. In Ungarn dagegen
bestimmt hauptsächlich die persönliche wirtschaftliche Lage die Bewertung. Die Ergebnisse
bestätigen nicht, daß in postsozialistischen Gesellschaften die Politik generell mehr zählt als
die Ökonomie. Weiterhin sollten bei der Untersuchung postkommunistischer Regime zusätz-
liche Output-Dimensionen wie soziale Sicherung, soziale Gerechtigkeit und öffentliche
Sicherheit berücksichtigt werden.
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1 Public support and consolidation of democracy
Ten years after the collapse of the Eastern bloc, some Central and Eastern European countries
(CEEC) have managed the transition from state socialism to democracy and market economy
successfully, whereas others have not. In political theory, a successful transformation consists
of two steps: an initial stage of transition from authoritarian to democratic rule, and a stage
of consolidation of the new system. Among researchers there is a widespread consensus that
liberalization and democratization are the essential elements of transition. The definition of
consolidation is much more controversial. Plasser/Ulram/Waldrauch (1997) discussed
several concepts of consolidation. For our purpose, we would like to follow their conclusion.
Consolidation can be seen as (1) the stabilization and effective functioning of the basic
principles of the new system; and (2) as the process of adaptation of behavior and attitudes
that promotes such a stabilization and effective functioning (ibid.: 28). Democratic rules
should be accepted “as the only game in town” (Linz 1990).
In this paper, we concentrate on mass support and legitimacy in several post-communist
countries. Przeworski (1991) or Di Palma (1990) do not believe that attitudes are decisive
for consolidation. Rather, they focus on behavior and the presence or absence of an alternative.
“What matters for the stability of any regime is not the legitimacy of this particular system of
domination but the presence or absence of preferable alternatives” (Przeworski 1986: 51).
Others regard attitudes and mass support as a (Merkel 1996) or the (Diamond 1994) key
variable in the consolidation process. Diamond defines consolidation as a “process by which
democracy becomes so broadly and profoundly legitimate among its citizens that it is very
unlikely to break down” (ibid.: 15). In our view, legitimacy should be regarded as a key
variable. It is a necessary, but not a sufficient precondition for a successful transformation.
Without mass legitimacy it is very unlikely that the rules of the new system become rooted in
society; and without pro-democratic elites widespread support of democracy among the
population may not be sufficient to build up a stable democracy. Stressing the importance of
legitimacy means arguing against theories that only regard elites as crucial actors in the
transformation process. Both citizens and elites are important actors.
The best-known conceptual framework for analyzing legitimacy is the one Easton (1975)
developed. Easton distinguishes among  three objects of support: (1) political community, (2)
political regime and (3) the authorities responsible for governing. Furthermore, he distin-
guishes between two different modes of support. Specific support is output- and short-term
oriented, whereas diffuse support is based on long-term value commitment, which is more
or less independent of the actual performance of the system. In our analysis, we will
concentrate on specific support for the new regime.
With reference to Pridham’s (1995) distinction between positive and negative consolida-
tion, one can also differentiate between positive and negative legitimacy. Positive legitimacy
means support for the system as it is. Negative support means support for the new system in
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so far it is regarded simply as being better than the former one or any other alternative:
“Democracy as the lesser evil” (Rose/Mishler 1996). In this case Valenzuela (1992) speaks
of “inverse legitimacy”.
If legitimacy plays a significant role, two important questions arise: Under which
conditions do people support the new system? What are the sources of legitimacy? One
possible source is mentioned above: inverse legitimacy. Because many East Europeans had
been completely dissatisfied with the communist system, the new system might have acquired
support in advance simply because it was something different (cf. Rose 1992). The revolutions
of 1989/1990 confirmed the inability of state socialism to fulfil two basic needs: the need for
freedom and participation on the one hand and for material well-being on the other. As time
goes by, however, this source of negative legitimacy might dry up. The new system must
achieve positive legitimacy.
According to rational choice theory, the post-communist system will be evaluated in terms
of performance, “what it is and what it does” (Rose/Mishler/Haerpfer 1998: 143). It will be
evaluated in terms of political output (civil rights, liberties etc.) as well as in terms of
economic output (individual living conditions, development of national economy etc.). There
is little doubt that East Europeans hoped to gain both political freedom and economic
prosperity from their revolutions.
But what is more decisive: political output or economic output? This is not a purely
academic question. The major challenge for the CEEC was and still is the problem of carrying
out political and economic reforms almost simultaneously. In most countries there has been
a rapid improvement in political conditions, but economies nose-dived during transforma-
tional recession, imposing high social costs on large segments of the population. Although we
have the evidence that most of the New Democracies have survived these critical years of
economic decline, we still do not know what impact this had on mass support for the new
political regime. Already in 1959, Lipset argued that “the better the economic situation, the
higher the level of support for the democratic system”. In the same vein, Przeworski (1991:
32) and Meyer (1993: 5) see the ability of a system to improve material welfare as decisive
for compliance and participation. Rose (1995), on the contrary, goes to battle for political
output. In his view, freedom from state interference is a “fundamental value by which people
discriminate between political regimes” (ibid.: 467/468). Thus, he regards freedom as the
major source of legitimacy.
With our own empirical analysis we attempt to go deeper into the question “what matters
more: politics or economics?” by means of the New Democracies Barometer, the German
Welfare Survey and the Euromodule. Our results do not confirm that politics are the most
important factor for mass support. Furthermore we want to argue that it is fruitful to take into
account the social performance of the new system. Our analysis is conducted at two levels.
The first takes a macro approach by explaining differences in average support between
countries by political, economic, and social indicators. The second takes a micro approach.
Here we deal with the variance of specific support within countries and explain these within-
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country-differences in comparative perspective. At this step we break up the somewhat
artificial dichotomy between politics and economics by adding other  issues that might serve
as important output criteria for evaluating the performance of a system: protection, social
security and justice.
2 Explaining differences between countries
We start with the average level of approval of the new regimes by using the five waves of the
New Democracies Barometer (NDB) and similar surveys conducted in East Germany and
Russia.1 Thus, twelve countries are included in our analysis: Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia,
Czech Republic, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia and
Ukraine. Respondents were asked to use a scale from to –100 (worst) to +100 (best) in order
to evaluate how the government performs.2 They were asked to rank the “former communist
system” as well as the “current system of governing with free elections and many parties”.
Similar questions were asked concerning the way the economy functions. The questions
referred to the “former socialist economic system” and to “the current economic system”.
Giving these wordings, it is obvious that specific support rather than diffuse support is
measured.
2.1 Mapping support in Central and Eastern Europe
In cross-national comparison, the evaluations of Central and East Europeans show remark-
able differences (see figure 1). In the Czech Republic for instance, the current political system
is rated on average much better than the communist one, and the current economic system is
also rated better than the former planned economy. Only in 1998 satisfaction with the current
system declined, due to an unexpected economic crisis and political instability (Haerpfer/
Wallace 1998, Juchler 1998). Hungary is an example for a country with low mass support.
In each survey both the current political and the current economic system is rated lower than
its socialist predecessor. This lasting negative mood is remarkable, since, like the Czech
Republic, Hungary belongs to the group of successful countries insofar as objective criteria
of system transformation are concerned. Only in the very beginning, in 1991, did the approval
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Figure 1: System evaluation in three countries (national averages)
Data: 1991-1998 New Democracies Barometer, own calculation
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of the new political system reach that of the former political system. Romania stands for a third
pattern with – on average - a positive evaluation of the current political system (better than
the communist political system), but a negative evaluation of the current economic system
(worse than the planned economy).
With a two-by-two-matrix of mass support we get a clear classification of all observed
countries (see table 1). In addition, we can see changes over time in specific support. By
slightly simplifying the picture, we have a cluster of four countries where transformation is
seen as a double success: the Czech Republic, Poland, East-Germany, and Slovenia. Double
success means that on average citizens rate both the new political and the new economic
system higher than the socialist counterparts. In Hungary, Russia, Belarus and Ukraine we get
the opposite picture: transformation is seen as a double failure. According to mass opinion,
both the political and the economic system have turned to the worse, compared to the socialist
Table 1: A typology of countries according to average support (in brackets: year of survey)
Data: 1991-1998 New Democracies Barometer, own calculation
economic success/
political failure
double success
double failure political success/
economic failure
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past. This negative stance is especially interesting, because with the exception of Belarus there
have been substantial gains in political freedom and civil rights throughout the region. In
Romania, Croatia, Bulgaria and Slovakia, citizens evaluate the changes since 1989 on average
as a political success, but as an economic failure. This reflects the fact that the political
liberalization people longed for had been accompanied in most countries by serious macro-
economic problems. It is not surprising that one cell of the matrix remains empty; in none of
the CEEC do people perceive a positive development of the economy while at the same time
perceiving a negative development of the political system.
The stability of the countries’ position in our matrix is remarkable. From 1991/92 to 1995,
nine out of twelve countries remained stable. And from 1991/92 to 1998, eight out of twelve
countries remained stable. In cross-sectional perspective this means mass opinion about the
outcomes of the transformation process has not fluctuate very much over time, as far as the
national average is concerned. Among the countries “moving” more often is Slovenia.
Average support of the Slovenian population has increased from political success/economic
failure (1991, 1992) to double success (1994, 1995), and recently retreated to political
success/economic failure (1998). In general, the last NDB of 1998 revealed declining support
in many countries. Only Poland and East Germany (last data from 1996) remained left as a
double success, whereas the group of double failures has grown to five countries, enlarged
by Croatia.
To some degree the cross-national heterogeneity in mass support corresponds to the
heterogeneity of transformational pathways. Some countries have been very successful in
establishing a pluralistic democracy and some kind of market economy, whereas in others this
was and still  remains a path of trial and tribulation. In Poland, economic output is now 20
percent higher than in 1989, whereas in the Ukraine it is about 60 percent lower (cf. Unicef
1999, Gregory 1999). In Hungary the rules of democracy are well established, whereas in
Belarus the Lukashenka regime is heavily authoritarian (cf. Juchler 1997, Lorenz 1999). Lazic
and Sekelj (1998) distinguish between three clusters of countries according to their chances
for a successful reform: countries of “probable transformation” (Poland, Czech Republic,
Hungary), intermediate countries of “potential transformation” (Romania, Bulgaria) and
anomic countries with an “uncertain transformation” (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus).
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2.2 Does politics matter more at the macro-level?
Empirical information about the progress of political and economic reforms are provided by
organizations like the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) or other
think tanks (cf. EBRD 1999, UNICEF 1999). Two of their assessments (for 1995) are
combined in the first diagram of figure 2: the rating of economic reform progress and of
political reform progress. There is a clear positive correlation between the two.
“The countries most advanced in economic reform are also the countries most
advanced in the consolidation of democracy” (EBRD 1999: 113).
Both processes seem to be mutually reinforcing rather than conflicting. The second diagram
of figure 2 combines the average ratings of the current political and economic system – each
in relation to the former. The ratings were calculated using data from the NDB surveys. As
with progress in institutional reform, specific support for the two systems is strongly
correlated. The countries with the highest approval of the new political system are also the
countries with the highest approval of the new economic system. If put on top of each other
there is a striking similarity of the two pictures. The countries most advanced in the
transformation process are also the countries with the strongest specific support. That means
that mass opinion can be regarded as a fairly reliable measure of whether developments in
transition countries take the right or wrong direction. Only in the case of Hungary and Romania
is there a considerable gap between “real” reform progress and the mood of the population
(cf. Seifert/Rose 1994 for the explanation of this gap).
Which national characteristics have the strongest impact on specific support? In order to
get an idea about how the cross-national differences in satisfaction can be explained best, we
computed bivariate correlations between the average mass support and several political,
economic, and social indicators on an aggregate level of countries for 1995 and 1998 (see
table 2). With life expectancy  also the social dimension of transition is included, which is
usually neglected in research on legitimacy. As the dependent variables we used the difference
between the ratings of the current and the former political regime, as well as the current and
the former economic system. Thus, we measure satisfaction with the current systems in
relation to their socialist counterparts.
Because of the strong relationship between politics and economics demonstrated above,
one has to consider both sides: political support and economic support. For political support,
we expect to find the strongest correlations with political indicators, while for economic
support we expect to find the strongest correlations with economic indicators.
The bivariate correlations are shown in tables 3 and 4. The relationships between approval
of the economic system and all of the economic indicators are statistically significant. The
better the economy performs, the higher the average support. The change in life expectancy
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Figure 2: The objective and subjective relationship between politics and economics
Data: 1995 New Democracies Barometer, own calculation
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Table 2: Indicators for bivariate correlations with mass support
POLITICAL INDICATORS
FREEDOM
Freedom House rating, combined averages for political rights and civil liberties, measured on a 1-to-7 scale.
”1” represents the highest degree of freedom and ”7” the lowest. Countries whose combined averages for
political rights and civil liberties fall between 1.0 and 2.5 are designated ”free”; between 3.0 and 5.5 ”partly
free”; and between 5.5 and 7.0 ”not free” (source: Freedom House Reports, various volumes, and website).
FREEDOM/1989
Freedom House rating compared to the 1989 rating.
POLITICAL REFORM INDEX:
In an EIU (The Economist Intelligence Unit) poll of thirty analysts on Eastern Europe associated with the
Economist Group, the respondents were asked to rate on a scale of 1 to 4 (best) the extent to which Eastern
European countries currently measure up to average EU standards in the development of political institutions
(source: Transition 7/8, 1996: 9).
PRESIDENTIAL POWER
Presidential power over cabinet, measured according to criteria in Shugart and Carey 1992. For 1998, a
slightly modified version of the scale is used (power of political executives, according to EBRD Transition
Report 1999: 104).
NUMBER PARTIES IN EXECUTIVE
Number of parties represented in government, a measure for the fragmentation of the political system
(source: EBRD Transition Report 1999: 104.
CONSTITUTIONAL TYPE
Dummy variable, parliamentary or semi-presidential system (according to classification in Juchler 1997).
ECONOMIC INDICATORS
GDP
The gross national product per capita, adjusted for purchasing power parities, indicates the average level of
prosperity. It represents the total final output of goods and services produced by an economy during a given
period (source: Fischer Weltalmanach 1999, F.A.Z., 23.11.1998).
GDP/1989
Level of GDP, with base year 1989 = 100 (source: Matutinovic 1998, UNICEF Regional Monitoring Report
1999).
REAL WAGES / 1989
Level of real wages, with base year 1989 = 100. A proxy for the quantity of goods and services a money
wage can buy, the real wage represents the money wage adjusted for inflation (source: UNICEF Regional
Monitoring Report 1999).
ECONOMIC REFORM INDEX
The EBRD rates on a scale of 1 to 4 (best) progress across countries in a number of areas of reform: large-
and small-scale privatization, enterprise restructuring, price liberalization, competition, liberalization of trade
and foreign exchange system, and banking and other financial reform. These scores can be summed into a
synthetic indicator of overall economic reform progress (source: Transition 4,1995: 3; Transition 7/8, 1996:
9, EBRD Transition Report 1999).
SOCIAL INDICATORS
LIFE EXPECTANCY
Male life expectancy at birth (in years). A widely used measure of the general level of mortality, this is the
theoretical number of years a newborn will live if the age-specific mortality rates in the year of birth are
taken as constant. The life expectancy is a good measure for the overall living conditions (source: UNICEF
Regional Monitoring Report 1999).
LIFE EXPECTANCY/1989
Change in life expectancy compared to 1989.
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Table 3: Correlations between macro-variables and evaluation of the new economic system
Level of significance: * 95%, ** 99%; - = not significant
Data: 1995, 1998 New Democracies Barometer, own calculation
Indicator Pearson’s r 
 
1995 
Spearman’s rho 
 
1995 
 Pearson’s r 
 
1998 
Spearman’s rho 
 
1998 
Politics -     
Freedom - -  -.58* -.83** 
Freedom/1989 - -  - - 
Executive power - -  - - 
Number parties in executive .60* -  - - 
Constitutional type - -  - - 
Political reform index .73** .64*  Not available Not available 
      
Economics      
GDP .73** .72**  .65* .73** 
GDP/1989 .76** .66*  .82** .69* 
Real wages/1989 .75** .79**  - .66* 
Economic reform progress .77** .76**  .65* .75** 
      
Social indicators      
Life expectancy .81** .82**  .78** .78** 
Life expectancy/1989 .84** .84**  .76** .70* 
 
Table 4: Correlations between macro-variables and evaluation of the new political system
Level of significance: * 95%, ** 99%; - = not significant
Data: 1995, 1998 New Democracies Barometer, own calculation
Indicator Pearson’s r 
 
1995 
Spearman’s rho 
 
1995 
 Pearson’s r 
 
1998 
Spearman’s rho 
 
1998 
Politics      
Freedom - -  - -.69* 
Freedom/1989 - -  - .67* 
Executive power -.63* -  - - 
Number parties in executive .77** .65*  - .62* 
Constitutional type - -  - - 
Political reform index .61 -  not available not available 
      
Economics      
GDP - -  - - 
GDP/1989 .84** .76**  .75* .58* 
Real wages/1989 - -  - - 
Economic reform progress .65* -  - - 
      
Social indicators      
Life expectancy .82** .71**  .66* .59* 
Life expectancy/1989 .84** .68**  .64* .58* 
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during post-socialism, however, has the strongest correlation. Thus, social developments
seem to be a very important factor in producing support for the new system. Economic
performance and institutions work their effect on the population through the social conditions
they produce. Taking the political variables into consideration, only few of the relationships
have statistical significance.
Now we turn to the support for the new political system (table 4). Surprisingly, most
political variables fail to explain cross-national differences. In 1995, the number of parties
in executive has the strongest correlation. The more parties having a share in government, the
larger the part of the population that feels represented by the government, which thereby
improves satisfaction. Neither freedom nor gains in freedom can explain cross national
differences in 1995. The change in economic output and the two indicators of life expectancy
show much higher bivariate correlations with public opinion. In 1998, the picture remains
largely the same. For the political indicators, only some rank correlations become statistically
significant. The change in economic output and the two social indicators remain important,
albeit the coefficients are somewhat lower in 1998.
To sum up, political support as well as support of the new economic system is correlated
with at least one indicator of each group (politics, economics, social indicators). It is not
surprising that all sections mentioned have an impact on both the political and the economic
support because it shows the coherence of political, economic and social consequences of
transition. Nevertheless the low correlation between political indicators and political
support in comparison to the high correlation between socioeconomic indicators and political
support is an unexpected result. For the economic support the picture meets our expectations:
economic and social developments have an higher impact than political ones.
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3 Explaining differences within countries
In order to answer the question of what really matters more, one has to concentrate on micro-
level analysis. Therefore, in this section we will use the NDB for identifying the pattern of
support within countries. In addition, we will use multivariate methods by means of the
Euromodule and the German Welfare Survey in order to identify the relative importance of
the determinants of political support.
3.1 Different opinions about system change
In the above section we classified transition countries according to average support. But
within countries, people might think very differently about the transformation process (cf.
Rose/Mishler 1996). Thus we now will look at different types of supporters in each country
and the distribution of these types by means of NDB data from 1995 and 1998. For this purpose
we use the same questions concerning system evaluation (as it is today and as it was in the
socialist era). The following matrix shows all possible combinations between the relative
support for the current economic and the relative support for the current political system
(relative to the former system). Because we are now looking at individuals, we may have the
case that for some respondents nearly nothing has changed compared to the socialist past.
Therefore the matrix is expanded to a 3-by-3-matrix (table 5).
In order to reduce complexity, we combined some fields to produce five categories of
support: (1) people who see political and economic progress (double success); (2) people
perceiving a step backwards in both systems (double failure); (3) people who see an
improvement in one system but no change in the other (partial success); (4) people who see
a deterioration in one system but no change in the other (partial failure); and (5) people who
see either no change in both systems or those who see an improvement in one system but a
deterioration in the other (no change)3 These types can be ranked in accordance to their overall
system support as follows: double success (highest support), partial success, no change,
partial failure, and double failure.
How are these five types distributed in each country? Will we find a vast majority of
double-success-votes in countries that have managed transition very well, or is the picture
mixed even there? There is no consensus in any of the countries when people take stock of
transformation (see figure 3). In 1995 this is most obvious in Romania, Slovenia, and Croatia.
A relative majority (one third of the population) in these countries discerns no significant
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Table 5: Taking stock of transformation: possible combinations
* no change means that the difference is between +/- 10 on a scale ranging from –200 (former sy-
stem was absolutely better) to +200 (current system is absolutely better)
partial success double success
double failure partial failure
Economic
System
better now
worse now
Political System
better nowworse now
no change*
no change*
partial failure
no change
(success and failure)
no change
(success and failure)
partial successno change
changes but the segment of the population seeing a double success has nearly the same size.
In Slovakia and Bulgaria we also find two large groups, double failure and no change, each
representing around one-third of the population.
In the other countries there is a dominant way of thinking, either double success or double
failure. But one can find all types of support in these countries, too. In East Germany, Poland
and the Czech Republic, around two-thirds of the population are satisfied with system change,
while around one third is dissatisfied or neutral. The new independent states formerly
belonging to the Soviet Union, have by far the smallest group of citizens with a very positive
evaluation (double success), and the largest group with a very negative stance. In Hungary,
too, negative evaluations are predominant; only one fifth of the population perceives at least
a partial success.
PAGE 18
UNDERSTANDING REGIME SUPPORT IN NEW DEMOCRACIES
Figure 3: Evaluation of New Democracies in Eastern Europe - 1995 and 1998
Data: 1995 and 1998 New Democracies Barometer, own calculation
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For most of the countries we find a less encouraging picture in 1998. With the exception
of Belarus, Bulgaria, and Hungary, the share of people dissatisfied with transition (partial
failure or double failure) has grown, most dramatically in Slovenia and Croatia. In these two
countries, the proportion saying that transition was a double failure has doubled from 1995
to 1998. As in 1995, the strongest – negative – consensus can be found in the Ukraine. In
Belarus, contrary to the overall development of declining support in the CEEC, the group
regarding transition as a double failure has shrunk sharply, but is still large. In Bulgaria the
main shift is that the group of joint success has doubled up to a share of one quarter of the
population.
Taking these findings together, one can detect a dominant way of thinking in some countries,
but a mixture of support in all countries. People who are positively affected by the transition
(the “winners”) may support the changes whereas the “losers” may not (Juchler 1994: 280,
Plasser/Ulram/Waldrauch 1997).4 Both extreme opinions are inversely distributed, i.e. in
countries where the group of winners is large the group of losers is small and vice versa. From
1995 to 1998 evaluations changed in the direction of a less encouraging picture. This might
be due to the social consequences of transition that people might not have taken into account
in the first years of the process. In order to go deeper into this question, in the next section we
will discuss the results of two recent publications showing that on the micro-level, politics
matters more than economics; and we will analyze the determinants of political support using
more recent data from Hungary and East Germany.
3.2 What matters more for the citizens?
In a few articles the question of what determines mass support in post-communist countries
has been answered empirically by using survey data. We discuss two recent articles. Both
compare the influence of political and economic output.
By means of the Central and Eastern Eurobarometer (CEEB) 1995, Hofferbert/Klingemann
(1999) found that both economic and political output are positively related to satisfaction with
democracy. Both anticipation of an improvement in the household’s financial situation in the
near future and a high level of satisfaction with the human rights conditions in a country leads
to a higher level of satisfaction with democracy. But human rights conditions seem to be a more
potent force for democratic legitimacy:
“In all countries but Albania, views on human rights are stronger predictors of
democratic satisfaction than are economic assessments. Respect [of the system,
J.D./V.T.] for individual human rights is about twice as important for the gen-
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eration of support for democracy than are personal economic expectations”
(ibid.: 170).
Their explanation is that the main shortcoming of the old regimes was the absence of freedom
and democratic rights. The revolutions had been for freedom, not for groceries. As a result
of these experiences, democratic rights are of utmost importance for current support. Although
Hofferbert/Klingemann’s figures speak for themselves, one has to bear in mind that each output
dimension is measured by just one indicator.
With the New Democracies Barometer 1993 and by using more than just two independent
variables, Rose/Mishler/Haerpfer (1998) came to the same conclusion as Hofferbert/
Klingemann: both economics and politics influence support, but politics matters more.
“When a full set of economic influences are combined with a full set of meas-
ures of political attitudes, this shows that while some economic attitudes exer-
cise some influence on regime support politics matters more” (ibid.: 178).
Our main critical remark is that computations are not done for the countries separately, but
for a fictive country, the NDB-mean, consisting of nine CEECs. Furthermore, in their
interpretation they did not mention that the sociotropic evaluation of the current economic
system is by far the most important single variable determining support for the new political
regime.
In our opinion the major shortcoming of this research is that the dimensions of regime
performance measured by the NDB or the CEEB are rather limited. Political output and
economic output are included, but several other important dimensions are neglected.
According to the World Bank (1997), modern democratic states must provide certain basic
services for its citizens. Listed among these services are political liberties, macroeconomic
stability, the rule of law, an adequate social safety net, protection of the environment and
national defence. Philosophers like Rawls (1975) stress the importance of equal opportunities
and social justice. For Rawls justice is the primary virtue of social institutions. Feminists
argue that a major criterion for evaluating a system are equal opportunities for men and women.
All these dimensions refer to the quality of a given society in a broader sense and are related
to the quality of life of its population. During transition, quality of society has improved along
some dimensions, but deteriorated along others (cf. Illner 1998, Matutinovic 1998). On the
one hand, the disappearance of rationing and shortages and enlarged opportunities for
political participation and private initiative have improved the daily life of many people. On
the other hand, throughout the region there has been growing unemployment and poverty and
an increase in income inequality. In many countries, crime rates have risen, and the state has
proven unable to provide a sufficient social safety net (Milanovic 1995, Gregory 1999b,
Speder/Schulz/Habich 1996). The most worrying fact is the declining life expectancy in some
societies, mainly in the former Soviet countries. All these aspects might affect satisfaction
with democracy.
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Figure 4: Perceived realization of public goods: East Germany and Hungary compared (mean scores)
Data: 1998 German Welfare Survey, 1999 Hungarian Euromodule, own calculation
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Figure 4 shows for two post-communist countries, Hungary and East Germany, how regime
performance is evaluated in a variety of aspects, with data stemming from the Hungarian
Euromodule 1999 and the German Welfare Survey 1998. People were asked whether they
think that a number of public goods or desired features of society have been achieved in their
country. Based on theoretical considerations the items can be grouped into four clusters: items
referring to liberties and democratic rights, to protection, to justice, and to social security.
This is confirmed by factor analysis to a large extent. Respondents had four options to choose
their answer: fully realized, rather realized, rather not realized, and not at all realized. For
the purpose of presentation we take the mean scores of the 13 items as an indicator of the degree
of perceived realization.
The basic pattern is largely the same in both countries. People are most satisfied with the
realization of liberties, followed by protection, justice, and social security. A vast majority
regards freedom of religion, of speech, and of political participation as being achieved, but
only a minority does so with regard to the just distribution of wealth, protection from crime,
social security, and the chance to get a job. The answers show that democratic rights (the
political output of post-communist transition in a narrow sense) are seen as more or less
guaranteed, whereas the regime performance in other dimensions, especially in the domain
of social goods, is evaluated less positively. In these policy areas, the state socialist regimes
had claimed to be superior to the capitalist countries. The social consequences of transition
has led to widespread feelings of social insecurity and injustice within the population (cf.
Delhey 2000), and there might be some nostalgia for the paternalistic security and the
egalitarian society of the socialist era.
Another general pattern is that East Germans evaluate the German society a bit better than
the Hungarians evaluate their society. For example, East Germans are more satisfied with
protection of private property, protection of the environment and with social security issues
(albeit not wholly satisfied). This is mainly due to the fact that in the special case of the East
German transition a ready made state and huge financial resources have been transferred from
West Germany, mitigating the vehemence of social changes (Zapf/Habich 1996). For
Hungary, no such “external” assistance has been available. However, the high unemployment
in East Germany has led to the impression that chances to get a job are very limited, and thus
the freedom to choose an occupation is perceived as mostly unachieved.
By means of OLS regression we explore the impact of these “public goods” on specific
support for today’s democratic regimes in Germany and Hungary. The respondents’ overall
satisfaction with democratic institutions in their country, measured on a scale from 0
(‘completely dissatisfied’) to 10 (‘completely satisfied’), serves as the dependent variable.
As in the NDB, East Germans show a higher degree of satisfaction than the Hungarians do
(mean score of 5.5 in East Germany, 4.6 in Hungary). Independent variables are the above
mentioned items referring to “public goods”: freedom, security, justice, and protection.
Additionally the individual economic situation is included measured as (1) satisfaction with
actual standard of living and (2) future expectations concerning living conditions in five years.
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With these two variables, we include the material benefit gained from the new political system
(economic output) into our model. We also control for age, gender, and education. The results
are given in table 6.
For East Germany we find indeed that freedom has a strong impact on satisfaction with
political institutions. Three out of four items of this dimension have a high potential influence,
right at the front freedom of political participation. From the issues related to justice, we found
that only the perception of a just distribution of wealth influences overall satisfaction with
politics. Neither the realization of protection nor the achieved social security seem to
Table 6: Explaining satisfaction with democratic institutions
Data: 1998 German Welfare Survey, 1999 Hungarian Euromodule, own calculation
* = significant at .05 level, ** = significant at .01 level.
Scales: Satisfaction with democratic institutions: 0 = completely dissatisfied,
10 = completely satisfied.
Freedom, Protection, Justice, Social Security items: 1 = not realized at all, 4 = fully realized.
Satisfaction with standard of living: 0 = completely dissatisfied, 10 = completely satisfied.
Future expectations of living conditions: 0 = worst, 10 = best.
Gender: 0 = female, 1 = male.
Education (Germany): 1 = no educational degree, 4 = university degree.
Education (Hungary): 1 = no educational degree, 8 = university degree.
   East Germany    Hungary
    b     t     b     t
FREEDOM
   ... of religion  0.126  1.192  0.125  1.223
   ... of speech  0.287**  3.463  0.119  1.430
   ... of political participation  0.462**  4.681  0.346**  4.535
   ... to choose occupation  0.206*  2.500 -0.078 -1.009
PROTECTION
   ... of private property -0.073 -0.755  0.247*  2.372
   ... of environment  0.140  1.262  0.068  0.648
   ... from crime  0.019  0.200 -0.049 -0.456
JUSTICE
   Equality of men and women  0.023  0.255 -0.101 -1.208
   Equality of life chances -0.064 -0.617  0.099  1.118
   Just distribution of wealth  0.402**  3.674  0.258*  2.274
SOCIAL SECURITY
   Solidarity with the poor  0.101  0.949  0.098  0.968
   Social security  0.158  1.434  0.157  1.350
   Chance to get a job  0.014  0.151  0.326**  3.185
ECONOMIC SITUATION
   Satisfaction with standard of living  0.159**  4.264  0.173**  5.147
   Future living conditions  0.131**  3.209  0.141**  4.020
Age  0.005  1.327 -0.004 -1.072
Education -0.020 -0.257  0.035  0.888
Gender -0.080 -0.661  0.217  1.717
Adj. R2  0.249  0.241
N of cases  847  977
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influence mass support. Concerning the economic situation, both satisfaction with standard
of living as well as future living conditions are decisive. Thus, the more freedom is perceived
to be guaranteed, the better the individual economic situation, and the more a just distribution
of wealth is achieved, the more East Germans are satisfied with German democratic
institutions.
By and large one gets the same picture for Hungary. However, contrary to East Germany,
the protection of private property and the chance to get a job are of importance. Concerning
freedom, only freedom of political participation has significant influence. In Hungary,
specific support correlates with at least one indicator of all performance domains taken into
consideration. We have strong evidence that the Hungarians consider more than just freedom
and the economic situation for their evaluation of the political system.
Regression coefficients give us only the potential influence of the independent variables
on the dependent variable. It is not possible to conclude what matters more because of the
different scales used for the right side variables. Therefore we calculated the actual influence
of each determinant, known as the level-importance statistics (Achen 1983). This measure
is simply the multiplication of the mean of each independent variable  by its unstandardized
coefficient (bi). The product is the net contribution to the level of the dependent variable. From
figure 5 we learn how much actual influence each factor excerted by adding up the actual
influence of all significant items to a total score for each performance domain.
For predicting specific support for the political system in East Germany, the perceived
guarantee of liberties and civil rights (freedom) is most important, followed by the individual
economic situation. Another, but less important predictor is the just distribution of wealth.
Thus, for East Germany our findings confirm the results of Rose/Haerpfer/Mishler (1998) and
Hofferbert/Klingemann (1999): Politics and economics matter, but political output matters
more.
For Hungary our findings did not bear out the hypothesis. The economic situation is by far
the most important predictor for satisfaction with democracy, twice as important as the
perceived guarantee of freedom. Social security, protection and justice are also of impor-
tance, albeit not prominent. Thus, for Hungary our answer to the question “what matters more:
economics or politics?” is twofold: First, economics matter more than freedom, at least after
ten years of transition. Second,  there are other domains of regime performance like social
security, protection, and justice, that are also significant sources of mass support. These
dimensions should not be neglected when studying legitimacy in the CEEC. The results raise
two questions: (1) Why do East Germany and Hungary differ? And (2) Why do our results for
Hungary differ from those cited above.
(1) Why do East Germany and Hungary differ? In part, the answer is already given above.
By and large, the living conditions in Hungary are much lower than in East Germany. This
means first of all a lower standard of living, but also a less developed social safety net,
widespread poverty, a larger gap between the rich and the poor, and higher crime rates.
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Figure 5: Actual influence of performance domains for predicting satisfaction with democracy
Data: 1998 German Welfare Survey, 1999 Hungarian Euromodule, own calculation
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Whereas this argument refers to the present, a second argument refers to the past: the nature
of the socialist regimes. The relatively “liberal” character of the Hungarian socialist regime
may provide an additional explanation why freedom is of lower relative importance in
Hungary than in East Germany, where the SED-regime had been highly repressive (for variants
of socialist regimes, see Brie 1996). In terms of liberties, the East Germans has gained “more”
from transformation than the Hungarians. This argument may be supported by the fact, that in
1995 in Hungary and Slovenia, the two countries which experienced the most liberal socialist
regimes, human right conditions are only a slightly better predictor for satisfaction with
democracy than economic conditions, whereas in other CEEC the difference is bigger
(Hofferbert/Klingemann 1999).
(2) Why do our findings for Hungary differ from those cited above? One answer could be:
measurement. In the surveys, political and economic output are operationalized differently.
Moreover, our data gave us the unique opportunity to include several other dimensions of
regime performance which are neglected in the NDB and CEEB. However, we believe that
the main answer is: the passage of time. As many scholars have supposed, gains in freedom
will have a lower impact on mass support after a few years. People may get used to the newly
achieved freedom and discover other problems, e.g. social problems. The losers of post-
communist transition may raise the question of how to make use of liberties if social security
and an appropriate level of living are not guaranteed. Obviously, at the end of the nineties the
times of “glorious political ‘battle’ for democracy” (Bernik 1994: 168) are over, and the times
of “muddling through” have begun. “In the new situation, even the great goals [of 1989, J.D./
V.T.] ... have lost a lot of their previous shine” (ibid.), and people focus more on down-to-
earth-problems. Obviously the Hungarians are very much engaged with down-to-earth-
problems.
From our two-country-comparison one can derive the following conclusions: (1) As time
goes by, freedom loses some of its power for generating mass support in transitional regimes,
whereas other aspects of regime performance become more important. (2) This process is
influenced by past and present experiences: by the character of the communist regime in a given
country (past) and the amount of social and economic problems during transition (present).
The more “liberal” the former communist system and the higher the social costs of
transformation, the more is specific support for the new system influenced by “hard” economic
and social output criteria, and less so by civil liberties.
The answer to the question, what matters more, leads directly to the political question, what
should be done? Ten years after the breakdown of communist regimes, improving the welfare
of broad strata is the major challenge of East European political leaders:
“The societies in transition must eventually become societies of mass consump-
tion. In order for this to occur they will need the safety net of the welfare state
to be expanded. If this does not happen, transformation will have been a fail-
ure” (Zapf 1997: 43, own translation).
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The improvement of individual welfare – not only for a small minority, but for the population
as a whole – is an unsolved problem in many transition countries. As long as many people
are confronted with social insecurity and the fear of not getting by, consolidation of democracy
– the process of adaptation of behavior and attitudes promoting the stabilization and the
effective functioning of the new system – will remain unfinished.
4 Summary
After ten years of transition in Central and Eastern Europe the question of public support and
consolidation of democracy is still very important. Specific support for the political regime
(Easton 1975) is a key variable in the consolidation process. From an objective view there
is a strong relationship between political and economic progress in CEE. There is also a strong
relationship between political and economic support. Cross-national differences in support
can be well explained by macro indicators. Surprisingly, support for the political regime is
more strongly related to social and economic indicators than it is to political indicators. But
there are different evaluations within countries, too. In each country there are people who feel
very dissatisfied with the current economic and political system compared with the socialist
past, as well as people who are very satisfied. From 1995 to 1998 support has declined in
most CEEC. This might be due to nostalgia for socialist paternalism, but this might also show
that people see their situation more clearly. After achieving freedom they became used to it
and started to concentrate more on economic and social consequences of transition. For East
Germany we have strong evidence that freedom still is the most important source of regime
support. However, for Hungary we have strong evidence that the individual economic
situation is the most important predictor for support. The improvement of individual welfare
is a decisive but yet unfinished task for politicians in order to achieve a consolidated
democracy.
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Notes
1 For East Germany we used the surveys OEKOEPOL 1993, and SOWIBUS 1994, 1995, and
1996. For Russia we used the New Russia Barometer.
2 We have recoded the scale, now ranging from 0 (worst) to 200 (best), with 100 as the neutral
point.
3 We have to mention that the group of people who see no changes mostly consists of those
who see political progress in combination with economic failure.
4 For the sociodemographic and socioeconomic characteristics of winners and losers in Hun-
gary and East Germany, see Habich/Speder 1998, Bird/Frick/Wagner 1998.
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